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Epistemic injustice is the phenomenon whereby we commit an injustice against
someone in their capacity as a knower. If we ignore someone’s knowledge due to
their membership in a particular group against which we are prejudiced, a kind of
harm arises that is uniquely epistemic. e building blocks of knowledge and be-
lief, of course, are concepts—and so conceptual injustice, if there were such a thing,
might be a more serious problem again. Is there such a thing as conceptual injus-
tice? Injustice at the conceptual level has been discussed before, but only with the
assumption of “subjectivism” about concepts—that there is no right or wrong way
to use a concept—and hence such that its consequences are restricted to problems of
misinterpretation or an impoverished ability to express ourselves. However, recent
accounts of concepts have shown that some conceptual schemes can be measur-
ably better than others, and this carries the implication that the conceptual schemes
recommended by those more knowledgeable than ourselves should be deferred to.
Once we recognize that concepts can be objectively better or worse, the nature of
the kind of epistemic injustice that can arise at the conceptual level is revealed to be
very dierent. It becomes clear that we will oen have a duty to defer to another’s
conceptual scheme, not merely for the sake of understanding what they are saying,
but in our own subsequent thinking on the subject.
Keywords: concept utility, epistemic injustice, objectivity, conceptual schemes, Fricker
1. Some familiar kinds of epistemic injustice
Suppose you are an excellent mechanic, and you are having a conversation
about the maintenance of sparkplugs at a cocktail party. Aer presenting
your insights regarding their proper care with the right kind of oil, a cele-
brated doctor leans over and contradicts everything you have said. Some-
thing has clearly gone wrong here. As good at doctoring as this celebre may
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be, her knowledge need not translate into knowledge of sparkplugs, and her
disregard of your higher epistemic standing in the domain of mechanics is
clearly a failing on her part, and an unpleasant way to treat you.
Cases like this one are perhaps not too grave, albeit annoying. However,
if the party who ignores or discredits the speaker does so because of the
speaker’s membership of a marginalized group, the oense becomes much
more serious. If a white administrator in the Canadian government ignores
the testimony of a First Nations member with respect to the harms com-
mitted against her community as part of the Residential Schools program,
and does so precisely because of a prejudiced stance against First Nations
people, then the discrediting of testimony has risen to a systematic level.
Prejudice against this group has extended into a systematic discrediting of
their knowledge, and has become an “epistemic injustice”. e harms in-
curred by the victim of epistemic injustice can be indirect, in this case by
lowering the chances of crimes committed in the Residential Schools pro-
gram being redressed.ey can also be direct: our knowledge is hard-won,
and ought to command respect of others. Whenever we ignore someone
else’s knowledge, we inevitably place ourselves on a pedestal above them as
more mature, wiser, or more insightful. Arbitrarily denying these “virtues”
of another in itself amounts to committing a harm against them—doing so
systematically on the basis of their membership in a particular group is an
epistemic injustice.
ere are likely many forms of epistemic injustice. Miranda Fricker’s
(2007) ground-breaking study of this phenomenon focuses on two clear
cases.e rst is what she calls testimonial injustice, where we fail to su-
ciently heed the knowledge imparted in another’s testimony. In the case of
testimonial injustice, the harm comes about due to failing to properly heed
the knowledge of another. Epistemic injustice typically discussed at this level
concerns failing to defer to the beliefs of another party—propositions they
have expressed for us in conversation. But at a lower level again in the archi-
tecture of propositions, beliefs and knowledge are to be found our concepts.
If the mechanic’s beliefs about how to take care of a sparkplug using oil con-
stitute knowledge, they do so only by dint of his grasp of concepts including
sparkplug, care, andoil, which concepts are the component parts of those
beliefs. If injustice can be committed against someone at the level of their
beliefs or knowledge, then surely an injustice committed against someone
at the level of their concepts would be graver still, since our concepts are
the component parts of our beliefs. If we have failed to appropriately defer
to others in our use of concepts, then all beliefs involving those concepts
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will be aected; whereas we could fail to adopt one specic belief without it
aecting any others (pace Quine 1951).1
Injustice that arises at the level of concepts has so far been explored un-
derwhat Fricker calls “hermeneutic injustice”.is kind of injustice can arise
when we lack the concepts required to articulate an injustice committed
against us—for example when there was no widespread concept of post-
natal depression, so that women experiencing this syndrome lacked an
appropriate concept to articulate the cause of their problem, or even under-
stand what they were going through, compounding the diculty they are
faced with. Since the lack of a medical concept to capture these symptoms
was due itself to themarginalization of women, the lack of a concept and the
wrongs that result has itself become an epistemic injustice. It can also occur
when we fail to acknowledge the way another is using a concept. Anderson
(2017) describes a black female graduate student using a concept “natural
kind” in one way, while a white male graduate student has a dierent grasp
of the concept. Rather than assuming that he has a mistaken understanding
of the concept himself, or adopting her use of the expression for the sake of
clearly understanding what she is saying, he rejects her as incompetent, and
that on the basis of his prejudice against women and black people. In this
case, the injustice is committed as a result of failing to defer for the sake of a
clear interpretation to the other person’s use of an expression.
“Hermeneutic” injustices, or injustices of interpretation, are generally
discussed under the assumption that concepts are the kinds of things whose
meaning is really a matter of personal use. If there is no objectively right or
wrong way to use a concept, and any harm that can arise here arises due to
misunderstanding or an inability to express ourselves. We could call this
an assumption of “subjectivism” about concepts or conceptual schemes.2
But what if there is an objectively better or worse way to use a conceptual
1 Of course, failing to defer to someone who is telling us about a better way to use a concept
will be failing to defer to their “testimony”. As a result, the kind of epistemic injustice I
am going to explore could be subsumed under testimonial injustice. But the dierence
between failing to defer to a belief and failing to defer to a conceptual scheme seems sub-
stantial enough to me to warrant a separate treatment.
2 See for example Anderson (2017, 3): “ere is no way to determine a person’s credibil-
ity regarding purely conceptual or linguistic matters on the basis of objective empirical
evidence. When someone says ‘Natural kind terms are not rigid designators,’ or ‘Privacy
is a right,’ or ‘Racism entails the existence of systematic oppression,’ there is no presently
known way to use objective empirical evidence to check whether that person is credible”,
and later “for present purposes, a conceptual claim is simply a claim for which there is no
agreed uponmethod for deciding its truth”. In some places Dotson (2012) seems to suggest
that failing to defer to another’s conceptual scheme seems to amount to failing to acquire
knowledge, and hence that there are better or worse conceptual schemes; if this is Dotson’s
view then her position is closer to the view I am advocating here, although she does not
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scheme? If concepts are the kinds of things that we can be objectively wrong
about, then we would have a duty to defer to themore knowledgeable party’s
use of a concept—but not just for the sake of temporarily interpreting what
they are saying. Rather, in our own subsequent thinking about the topic
the concept pertains to, we ought to adopt the conceptual framework of the
more knowledgeable party. And failing to do this because of a prejudiced
stance against the group the knowledgeable party belongs to would form a
distinctive kind of epistemic injustice.
To put this another way, if we assume subjectivism about concepts, we
leave a very specic kind of excuse on the table for the epistemic wrong-
doer. Even having recognized the conceptual scheme through which an-
other views the world and expresses their testimony, the epistemic wrong-
doer can say “I have heard what you said, and I understand what you mean
by those words; but, that is just not how I think about things”. is can re-
sult in various harms to the person or group whose conceptual scheme I
refuse to embrace. For example, suppose someone tells me that the con-
cept racism covers positive generalizations about a disenfranchised minor-
ity just as much as negative generalizations. For the sake of simply under-
standing what they are saying, I might interpret their utterances with this
in mind. But now suppose that once I have le the context of this particu-
lar conversation, I refuse to consider such generalizations as racist. If I have
a general belief like “racism is bad”, this will not necessarily stop me from
making these positive generalizations I have been warned about—which are
clearly harmful to the community I make those generalizations about. But
the harms incurred are also direct—if conceptual schemes can be better or
worse, then by ignoring another’s conceptual scheme, we harm the other as
a knower, just as we do if we ignore their testimony in other ways.
In this essay I argue that some conceptual schemes are, indeed, objec-
tively better than others, and that failing to fully adopt the conceptual scheme
of another can amount to a serious form of epistemic injustice. But how
could concepts be the kind of thing we can get “wrong”? To see how this
could be the case we rst need to explore the nature of concepts in more
depth.
2. Can one conceptual scheme be better than another?
Depending on your background, it may seem either intuitive, or absurd, that
one person could have a better conceptual scheme than another. To begin
with the intuitive approach, consider the following scenario adapted from
explain how a conceptual scheme could in fact be better or worse, which is part of my
current focus.
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Burge (1979). Amechanic arrives at the doctor with a headache, and tells his
doctor “I have terrible rheumatism in my head”. His doctor reassures him
that she probably can help with the pain, but advises him all the same that
whatever the cause, it cannot be rheumatism. “at is simply not what the
concept rheumatism means”, she insists, “rheumatism is a condition that
aects your joints”. Under ordinary circumstances, the patient will accept
the doctor’s authority here. He might complain that he intended to refer to
pain in his head, and he does not really care what “rheumatism” means; but
he will likely accept the doctor’s authority on the concept rheumatism all
the same (displaying greater epistemic humility than the doctor did before).
In this scenario, we might say, the mechanic has deferred to the doctor on
the concept rheumatism. We might also say, the mechanic has recognize
that he failed to grasp the concept, while the doctor properly grasped it.e
mechanic got it wrong, the doctor got it right.
On some views of concepts, however, such a transaction is mysterious.
On some views, aer all, concepts are merely labels that we use for objects
or collections of objects in our environment.e concepts themselves carry
no claims about the nature of the objects they pick out, it is only our beliefs
about the objects that fall under those concepts that do the work of telling us
something about them. On this view, it does not make much sense to sup-
pose that we could conceptualize things in the wrong way, any more than
the names in one language could be considered more correct than those in
another. As a result, it does not make sense to suppose that the doctor’s con-
cept of rheumatism could be more correct than the mechanic’s—rather,
the two are simply speaking dierent languages. Fodor (1994), for exam-
ple, defending such an account of concepts, argues that it is a fundamental
confusion of semantics (the domain ofmeaning) with epistemology (the do-
main of beliefs and knowledge) to suppose that anyone could have a better
set of concepts than anyone else. On this view, possessing a particular set
of concepts amounts to assigning a semantics to the particular “language of
thought” that you use to think about the world, and no one language can
be objectively better than any other. But this implies that some heated con-
temporary debates, such as the debate over what counts as falling under the
concept racism (see Sanneh 2019), are vacuous.ere is no right or wrong
answer to this question, on this view of concepts. It is as a result not possible
to commit an injustice by failing to defer to another’s authority on the ques-
tion what counts as racism, since no-one could have more well-informed
opinion than anyone else. Similarly, such an approach to concepts leaves the
“bad excuse” considered earlier on the table. If any one conceptual scheme
or “language of thought” (Fodor 1994) is as good as any other, then although
I can wrong someone by failing to interpret their utterances in accordance
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with the conceptual scheme they use to express themselves (a hermeneu-
tic injustice), I cannot wrong someone by failing to adopt their conceptual
scheme in my own subsequent thinking—even if they know far more about
the domain under consideration than I do.
Apart from rendering the debate over a concept like racism vacuous,
this Fodorian position renders many scientic debates about classication
vacuous. Whales used to be categorized as sh, and this was convincing for
many expert in the nature of whales at that time—“a whale is a sh with a
horizontal tail”, insists Ishmael (Melville 1851). But we have since revised the
conceptwhale as falling under the conceptmammal rather than fish, and
thereby revised both of these latter concepts at the same time (in the case
of mammal, now extending to cover whale where it did not before; and
in the case of fish, now failing to extend to whale, where before it did).
And it is surely the case that it is not just a change in fashion that has led
to this reclassication, but an improvement in our understanding—surely,
we think, we were wrong to classify the whale as a sh, and are right to now
classify it as a whale. How canwemake sense of this? What didwe get wrong
before that now we have right?
Égré and O’Madagain (2019) provide an account of the “epistemic util-
ity” of concepts that may make sense of these claims. e account there
focuses on the recent dispute over the term “planet”, or we can say, over the
proper meaning of the concept planet. I will explore this case in some de-
tail, and as we shall see, once we have such an account in place, it becomes
clear what is wrong with the “bad excuse”, and the duty to defer more com-
pletely to another’s conceptual scheme will become apparent.
Properly grasping this dispute involves a little historical groundwork. In
2006,Michael Brown discovered what was widely hailed as “the 10th planet”,
which he called Eris. But he shortly thereaer decided that in fact what he
had discovered ought not to be considered a planet at all. At the same time,
he came to believe that if Eris ought not to be considered a planet, then Pluto,
one of the standing family of planets, ought not to be considered a planet
either—for Pluto was much more like Eris than either of these were like the
other bodies referred to as planets. In essence, Brown started a debate over
the proper extension of the concept planet.
Although some commentators held that the dispute over themeaning of
planet was amere terminological switch, arbitrarily decided by convenience,
such that the old classication could not be “less correct” than the new one
(Chalmers 2011), Brown himself insisted that this was no mere terminolog-
ical dispute:
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e debate about whether or not Pluto is a planet is critical to our un-
derstanding of the solar system. It is not semantics. It is fundamental
classication. (Brown 2010, 232)
Brown’s opinion is that one classication of the objects in the solar system
turned out to be objectively incorrect, and that its aws were made salient
upon the discovery of new information about the solar system. Brown and
many others had already suspected the classication of Pluto as a planet to be
dubious. Pluto has an orbit around the sun of 17 degrees relative to the other
planets, which all orbit on the same plane. Pluto is not largely spherical, but
is shaped more like a potato. Pluto does not have a gaseous atmosphere,
but is instead cloaked with ice. And nally, Pluto has not cleared its orbit of
other objects—Pluto orbits the sun in a ring that includes discernible large
rocks and debris. With the discovery of Eris, a second body that shared
all of these notable properties that distinguish them from the other planets
was discovered, and this had the eect of intuitively creating a new category
of objects distinct from the original planets. is intuitive distinction was
mademore compelling still by the discovery shortly aer of a whole range of
bodies in the same region of the solar system, that all share these distinctive
features. Now, rather than a category with a single “oddball” member, being
Pluto, it seemed to many that we had instead two categories—the original 8
planets, and the new objects which for want of a neater title came to be called
“Trans-Neptunian Objects”. In a decision of the International Astronomical
Union, a new denition of planet was adopted, including one particularly
salient feature that set the original 8 planets clearly apart from this growing
category, namely that of having cleared its orbit of smaller objects and debris:
A planet is a celestial body that:
(a) is in orbit around the Sun,
(b) has sucientmass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces
so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round) shape, and
(c) has cleared the neighborhood around its orbit. (General Assem-
bly of the International Astronomical Union 2006)
is had the eect of ocially restricting the concept planet to those 8 ob-
jects in the solar system that had cleared their orbit of smaller rocks and
debris, and placing Pluto, Eris, and several other objects into the category
of TNO. But what is it, if anything, that makes the new classication more
correct than the old one?
is is where an account of concept utility becomes useful. Égré and
O’Madagain argue that a better conceptual scheme yields better beliefs—
not as a matter of subjective preference, then, but in measurable objective
terms. e account appeals to two features of beliefs that have been widely
recognized as contributing to their goodness or “utility”. On the one hand,
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we want the beliefs we form to be plausible, and ideally true. If we see a
bluebird lay a blue egg, we might infer “bluebirds lay blue eggs”.is seems
like a sound inference. We would not on the other hand be tempted to infer
from the same observation that “all birds lay blue eggs”. Wemay aer all have
seen eggs of other colours lying about, so that we are pretty sure that such
a general claim would be false. And false beliefs are unhelpful for obvious
reasons.
We might be inclined to think from this that our goal is always to adopt
only those beliefs that aremaximally likely to be true, or aremaximally plau-
sible. But as James (2016), Popper (2005) and others have observed, this
cannot be the case. Consider the judgment we made about bluebirds above.
If our our goal was always to maximize truth in our beliefs, we could re-
strict our claim to amore narrow conjecture than “bluebirds lay blue eggs”—
perhaps to “bluebirds in my garden lay blue eggs”, or even, to be absolutely
sure, simply “the bluebird I just saw laying a blue egg laid a blue egg”. Given
the observation, such a belief is guaranteed to be true. Of course, we do not
exercise such extreme caution in our beliefs, becausemore than just reliabil-
ity is valuable to us in our beliefs. We also want our beliefs to be informative.
If reliability were the only thing we cared about, then we could reduce the
strength of our beliefs so that they were guaranteed to be true—perhaps by
believing only tautologies. But such a set of beliefs would not tell us any-
thing about the world. What we are aer are beliefs that somehow strike a
balance between informativeness and plausibility, since it is important to us
that both of these features are present in our beliefs.
With these considerations in hand, wemay note that concepts, the com-
ponent parts of our beliefs, have two features that systematically covary with
the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs. First, our concepts can be
more or less homogeneous, so that the objects falling under a concept are
similar to one another.is will aect the plausibility of inductive general-
izations we form using those concepts. Consider the concept bluebird. If
the observation of one bluebird laying a blue egg leads us to make the gener-
alization “bluebirds lay blue eggs”, the plausibility of this generalization will
depend in part on how homogeneous the concept bluebird is. Notice that
if we make the generalization over a more diverse group, for example “birds
inmy garden lay blue eggs”, where “birds-in-my-garden” will now include
robins, crows, thrushes and so on, the plausibility of the inference immedi-
ately drops. When a generalization is made over a bunch of things from an
observation of one member of the bunch, the generalization gets less plausi-
ble as the diversity of the bunch goes up.e homogeneity of a concept will
therefore clearly eect the plausibility of the generalizations the concept is
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used to make.3 One property we would like our concepts to have, therefore,
is homogeneity.
Secondly, the number of things a concept extends over—which we call
the inclusiveness of the concept—will determine the informativeness of be-
liefs the concept is used to make.4 If we expand the domain covered by the
concept (in the subject position) in the generalization, as before, to include
not just bluebirds but “all birds”, then since all-birds includes bluebirds
and many more birds beside, the generalization is more informative than
the generalization extended to just bluebirds. But, of course, since increasing
the inclusiveness in this case decreases the homogeneity of the concept, the
generalization has thereby become less plausible. What is becoming clear is
that wewant our concepts to strike some sort of a balance between inclusive-
ness and homogeneity. If they include too many objects (e.g. “birds”), the
concept will become highly heterogeneous, and not very reliable for forming
generalizations; but if we focus on maximizing the homogeneity, for exam-
ple by only operating with extremely specic concepts like “the bird I saw
in my garden yesterday”, we reduce the inclusiveness of our concepts so that
we cannot make informative generalizations or predictions about our envi-
ronment. When categorizing objects in our environment, we want to nd a
conceptual scheme that strikes a balance between the two.
We can illustrate how to strike this balance easily. First consider how
the homogeneity of a conceptual scheme might change. e way we con-
ceptualize our solar system (leaving aside for now the complicating case of
Pluto), is largely into four concepts: planet, moon, asteroid, and star.
ese concepts are reasonably homogeneous, in the sense that the objects
that fall under each one are more similar to each other than they are to any
3 We assign a value of homogeneity to a concept as the number of properties the objects
falling under the concept have in common, divided by the number of properties they can
be distinguished by, assuming a xed set of discernible properties in the domain which are
determined by the perceptual mechanisms of the observer (e.g. has wings, a beak, lays blue
eggs).is assumes a basic set of concepts that an observer is likely to operate with, largely
focusing on perceptual properties. We ignore the “philosophical-puzzle” type properties
such as Cambridge properties or grue-like properties (cf. Goodman 1983).
4 At least, when the concept is in the subject position of an ampliative inference or (infor-
mative) universal generalization in the form “All As are Bs”. When the concept is in the
predicate position in such a claim, the claim becomes more informative when the concept
is less inclusive—or, more exclusive. Compare “All those things are birds”, with “All those
things are Grey Wagtails’. e latter tells you more than the former. Nevertheless, a con-
ceptual scheme that maximizes the inclusiveness and homogeneity of concepts overall will
also feature very narrow and very homogeneous concepts like “greywagtail” at lower levels.
A conceptual scheme that maximizes homogeneity of concepts throughout will therefore
permit bothmaximally informative and reliable generalizations both when concepts taken
from that scheme are in the subject and predicate position.
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objects falling under any other concept. But we could of course reclassify
things, adopting instead four alternative concepts: Moon-or-Large Planet,
Asteroid-or-Star, Small Planet-other-than Earth, and Earth. is overall
conceptual scheme has just the same inclusiveness as the concepts we use,
since the four concepts between them cover all the same objects. However,
the concepts themselves are highly heterogeneous. An observation about
onemember of the concept Asteroid-or-Star, will clearly not support a plau-
sible generalization to all members of the category. If we discover that as-
teroids are covered in ice, we should not expect to generalize this inference
to all members of the category (the only other member being the Sun). And
if we discover that one member of the category “Moon-or-Large Planet” is
inclined to have its ownmoons, we should not expect this of other members
of the same category. Clearly, simply for the sake of supporting plausible
generalizations, the standard conceptualization of the objects in the solar
system is better than this one.
Inclusiveness needs also to be taken into consideration in determining a
conceptual scheme. When Pluto was discovered rst, as noted above, it was
already recognized as being an “oddball” among the planets. Nevertheless,
it was grouped initially with the others. Now consider that if all we were
concerned with in forming conceptual groups was maximizing their homo-
geneity, and thereby raising the chances of making plausible generalizations
over the category based on observations of their members, then surely we
should have immediately assigned Pluto to its own special category at the
outset. We would then have had as our conceptual scheme of the solar sys-
tem, the concepts star, planet, moon, asteroid, and pluto. Why was
there no temptation to do this?e reason is that not only do we value ho-
mogeneity in our concepts, but we also value inclusiveness. A concept with
just one member does not support inductive inferences from observations
of that member to other objects—since there is only one object in the cat-
egory. is is not to say that there can never be any use for concepts with
just a single object, there can—but if an object is not too dissimilar to other
objects in an environment, then grouping it with them allows us to retain a
high degree of inclusiveness in our concepts. Once Eris was discovered some
70 years later, another object in the same region of the solar system quite like
Pluto, and thenmany other objects besides in that region, we now found our-
selves with a reason to distinguish Pluto from the other planets. We would
no longer be assigning Pluto to a category with very low inclusiveness, but
instead we would be assigning it to a category that would soon have asmany,
indeed many more members than the category planet. And this was why
(according to Égré and O’Madagain), with the discovery of these objects, a
new category called “trans-neptunian-object” was invented, and Pluto
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was moved from the category planet to this new category. e category
planet now increased in homogeneity, since the remaining members were
more similar to one another than any was to Pluto, and Pluto joined the cat-
egory of tno, where it hadmore in commonwith its new fellows than it had
with the Planets.
What we can see from these considerations is that there is, aer all, a
straightforward sense in which it is possible to have an objectively better or
worse conceptual framework (for a full treatment see Égré and O’Madagain
2019). Even if concepts do not individually do anything other than to label
a set of objects in our environment, when viewed as part of a conceptual
scheme it becomes clear that some sets of concepts are epistemically better
than others. As a result, it becomes clear that if someone else knows more
about a given domain than we do ourselves, then their classication of that
environmentwill likely be better than our own. If the astronomers tell us that
Pluto should not be grouped with the other planets, then we should defer to
their judgment—it is not simply a matter of their convenience, which could
of course be dierent for our own convenience. Rather it is likely that, as a
matter of fact, they have found a conceptual scheme with a higher epistemic
utility—one that is likely to yieldmore plausible and informative generaliza-
tions overall.
Similarly, if the doctor tells the patient that headaches should not be
grouped together with joint aches under the concept rheumatism, this is
probably because the doctor knows enough about the overall landscape of
ailments that shows her that a conceptual scheme that groups these two
aches together will have a lower epistemic utility (although she did not likely
think of it in these terms) than one that classies them distinctly. And if the
mechanic tells the doctor that sparkplugs should not be thought of under the
concept engine-part, this is likely because the mechanic knows something
about the landscape of artefacts that make up the assembly of a car such that
classifying spark plug in this way will lead to poor generalizations. It is not a
matter of convenience, and neither is it a consequence of our simply speak-
ing dierent “languages of thought”: some people in a community can know
more than others about how best to conceptualize a given domain.
Finally, although Iwould not try to decide herewhat will optimize a con-
ceptual scheme that includes concepts like racism and sexism, since I am
no expert on these issues, I wager it is a safe bet to suppose they can indeed
be measured in the same ways, such that one cannot arbitrarily alter their
extension without damaging the utility of the beliefs we form using these
concepts. Imagine someone who insists on using the concept “racism” to
include the kinds of behaviour that we are familiar with under this concept,
plus kite-ying. If, when we try to identify the extension of racism, we
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are trying to identify a category in a taxonomy of human behaviours that
will allow us to form a healthy epistemic outlook in this domain (i.e. reli-
able and informative beliefs), then it is clear that generalizations made using
this concept of racismwill be worse than they would be were kite ying ex-
cluded from the concept.ere is a fact of thematter about what the optimal
extension of the concept will be, and getting it right goes beyond personal
preference or conventional coordination.
Perhaps it might be worried that I am placing too much emphasis on
the epistemic role of concepts here, and that there could be other roles for
concepts that could over-ride their optimal use for forming beliefs. For ex-
ample, the US government at one point tried to change the meaning of the
concept torture to exclude water-boarding, in order that it could avoid be-
ing accused of violating the UN conventions against torture (Sundell 2011).
I am inclined to insist, agreeing with Simion (2017) that the epistemic role
of concepts will always be more important than other roles—so that opti-
mizing the epistemic utility of concepts should always over-ride other con-
siderations. Although it is true that concepts play dierent roles, some of
these roles are more fundamental than others, and the epistemic role is the
most fundamental. While we can adopt a concept with a particular exten-
sion in order to get out of being considered racist or in violation of an inter-
national convention, such considerations will not always be aected by our
concepts—there are lots of other ways we could get out of such diculties,
and there are lots of ways we could use concepts that would have no bearing
on these diculties. Our beliefs, on the other hand, will always be aected
by our concepts. Any deployment of a concept will result in the formation
of a belief. e epistemic utility of a concept should therefore be priori-
tized over any other considerations—since it is the “primary purpose” of a
concept, insofar as the function of a concept is to allow us to form beliefs,
and the goal of belief-formation is to have reliable and informative beliefs.
And even if other considerations sometimes do arise in our adjustment of
our conceptual schemes, epistemic utility should act as a “limiting consid-
eration” (Simion 2017) for any further choices we might make as to how to
deploy a concept.
3. A duty to defer
So far the examples considered are relatively trivial. Even if wewere to ignore
the position of the IAU on the concept planet, the upshot might simply be
some poor inferences about planets. However, such failures can easily rise
to the level of epistemic injustice. One debate that serves as a clear example
is the debate over the question what falls under the concept racism. If the
way we use term “racist” were simply a matter of coordinating on using a
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concept in the same way, so that we could communicate uently, then each
party to the debate should surely contribute equally (as Lewis (1979) imag-
ines us coordinating, game-theoretically, on the most widespread meaning
for a word in a linguistic community). Hence, groups that have historically
contributed to the oppression of others, such as men in the case of sexism,
or whites when it comes to racism, should presumably take their own opin-
ion of what counts as “racist” as seriously as the opinion of those who have
been victims of these attitudes—since we all use the words. And, it oen
seems to be the case that exactly this concern motivates many people when
confronted with a charge of being racist or sexist, to counter the charge by
oering their own account of what falls under those concepts—consider the
perhaps familiar refrain “well, what I mean by racism is something like a
lynch mob—so I cannot accept that my talking over you is an instance of
racism, sorry. . . ”.is is, of course, the “bad excuse” considered at the out-
set, that subjectivism about concepts leaves on the table. If the way a concept
is to be used is simply a matter of convenience or individual preference, and
there is no right or wrong answer about what counts as the extension of a
concept, then it is hard to say what is wrong with such a reply. Equally, if
there is no right or wrong way to use the concept, then the debate over what
counts as racism is rendered vacuous.
As mentioned at the outset, epistemic injustice that assumes this kind
of subjectivism about concepts has already been extensively explored. An-
derson (2017) has explored what he calls “conceptual competence injustice”.
On Anderson’s view, this kind of injustice is committed against another per-
son by assuming s/he lacks competence with some concepts s/he is working
with simply because s/he belongs to a marginalized community. Anderson
considers a white male graduate student ignoring the opinion of a black fe-
male graduate student, because he assumes she is using the concept “natural
kind” in the wrong way. In fact she is using the term following Soames while
he is using the term following Kripke. Instead of assuming either that he has
misunderstood the concept himself, or that they are simply using the con-
cept in dierent ways, he assumes that she is incompetent, and that because
of her race and gender.
Similarly, Fricker describes “hermeneutic” injustices—where the lack of
a concept, or a failure to grasp a concept, will result in deliberate misun-
derstanding or mischaracterization of someone else’s view, or an inability
to articulate your own. And Dotson (2012) considers “contributory injus-
tice”, where we fail to allow someone else to use a concept in the way most
suitable for their purposes, in the context of their discussion. e guiding
idea through these approaches to conceptual injustice is that it will result
Cathal O’Madagain 77
in wrongs concerning misinterpretation or an inability to express ourselves.
is is why Fricker characterizes such cases as “hermeneutic”.
Hermeneutical injustice is of an entirely dierent species, however, to
the kind of injustice that can arise once we acknowledge the possibility of
objectivism about concepts. If someone else merely speaking a dierent lan-
guage of thought by using concepts in a dierent way to the way we use them
ourselves, we certainly have a duty to capitulate to their use of words in hear-
ing them out. But we do not seem to have a duty to adopt their conceptual
scheme ourselves. We have every right to continue using our own concepts
the way we have been—indeed, it would seem that at, pains of incoherence,
we have just as much a right to use concepts the way we are used to, perhaps
to articulate and defend our own world-view and grievances, as we have a
requirement to acknowledge a dierent way of using those words, when they
are used dierently.
If, on the other hand, some people are using a concept in a way that is
more correct than others, then it would be wrong to fail to defer to their
use of concepts in our own thought and speech—we will have at least an
epistemic duty to defer. Not just temporarily, as Dotson considers, for the
sake of understanding someone—but also in our own use of the concept,
which we will have discovered to be, simply put, incorrect. If we fail to defer
to someone because of their membership in a group that we are inclined to
disparage, then such a failure will be an epistemic injustice.
e considerations raised in this essay indicate that the view on which
everyone’s opinion about what counts as racist or sexist is equally valid (à la
Fodor), or even that it might depend on some kind of implicit convention or
coordination between speakers (à la Lewis) is indeed wrong.5 How to con-
ceptualize a domain is not merely a matter of opinion or convenience, and
some conceptualizations of a domain can be objectively better than others.
Not only that, but those most knowledgeable of a particular domain should
be deferred to in their conceptualization. In that case, more weight should
be assigned to the opinion of the group with the greater knowledge of the
subject matter.is knowledge can be gained through careful study, so that
experts will know more than novices; but it can also be acquired through
experience, with some knowledge depending on having appropriate experi-
ence (Paul 2014). Experiencewith the subjectmatter of racism is presumably
experience with being subjected to racist behaviour. ose who have been
5 Or at least that it is wrong in general. ere could be specic cases for which nothing
more than coordination is required—but for some straightforward cases like natural kinds,
I think the view is certainly mistaken, and indeed I am inclined to think that the kind
of case where meaning comes down to nothing more than coordination for the sake of
communication are marginal (cf. King 2012).
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routinely subjected to racist behaviour will have greater sensitivity to the
contours of the phenomenon, will spot it more easily, and will have a greater
grip on the landscape of its varieties, subcategories, and super-categories.
At least if we are to take attempts to explore the concept of racism seriously
(e.g. Kendi 2016), we should defer to those with the greatest amount of ex-
perience in the same way we will defer to the International Astronomical
Union when we heed their advice with respect to a concept like planet.
A similar conclusion applies to a concept like sexist. Since women have
been subjected to sexism while men generally have not, then women have
more experience with the landscape of varieties of sexism than men do.
Again, they will be more familiar with the phenomenon, and quicker to spot
it. As a result, women are in a better position to categorize some behaviour as
sexist thanmen. By dint of unfortunate experience, they knowmore about it.
Althoughmen are oen quick to oer their ownopinionwith respect towhat
does or does not count as sexist, we should really consider such council in the
same way that we might consider the council of the doctor to the mechanic
when she advises him on what should really be classed as rheumatism, or
themechanic’s advice to the doctor on what counts as a sparkplug. When a
man refuses to defer to a woman’s conception of sexism precisely because he
has a dismissive attitude toward gender, he commits a form of epistemic in-
justice. And again this deference cannot be temporary—it is not simply for
the sake of understanding what she is saying. Rather, the deference should
be permanent—adopting the concept of sexism recommended by the more
knowledgeable party for the sake of one’s own thinking about the world,
rather than merely for interpretation of someone else’s beliefs.e “bad ex-
cuse” that subjectivism about concepts leaves on the table—“well that is just
how I see things, I have my own conceptual framework aer all”—is not
available once we recognize that conceptual frameworks can be objectively
better or worse.
4. Conclusion
e injustice of ignoring someone who knows more than you do, particu-
larly because that person is a member of some marginalized group, is in-
creasingly widely recognized as an important issue at the crossroads of epis-
temology and ethics. But one form of this kind of injustice, where we fail to
defer to someone’s conceptual scheme even when they understand the land-
scape that this conceptual scheme carves up better than we do ourselves, is
not only underexplored, but will actually be considered incoherent onmany
standard views of concepts. Where it has been explored, the most that has
been thought to bemorally required is that we temporarily defer to another’s
conceptual scheme in order to properly understand what they are saying.
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But once we realize that dierent conceptual schemes can be objectively bet-
ter or worse, however, and indeed that their competing epistemic values can
be measured, we can see how failing to defer to a better informed concep-
tual scheme—in the sense of adopting that scheme for ourselves rather than
simply tolerating it for the sake of a conversation—will constitute a centrally
important form of epistemic injustice. An account of concept utility like that
discussed here can be used to show how deference to the conceptual scheme
of another can be not only useful, but that failing to defer can be a form of
injustice. And it shows how the scale of deference required is much more
substantial than has been considered explored under the kind of conceptual
injustice explored so far.
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